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ABSTRACT 
Healthcare costs are not only an enormous strain on the U.S. 
economy but are expected to increase in the foreseeable future. Not 
surprisingly, clever fraudsters view the healthcare industry as a 
lucrative and attractive hotspot for illegal activity. Although federal 
and state governments have increased their funding and prosecu-
tion efforts relating to healthcare fraud, this fraud continues to be a 
major threat to the U.S. economy and every patient and consumer. 
The impact of healthcare fraud is substantial and far-reaching. 
Healthcare fraud in the U.S. affects not only the government, but 
also insurance companies, patients, healthcare providers, and con-
sumers. This Article examines the types of healthcare fraud and 
the major federal laws used to combat this type of fraud. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Healthcare costs are a significant drain on the U.S. econ-
omy.1 According to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), health expenditures in the U.S. are estimated to grow by 
an average annual rate of 5.8 percent between 2015 and 2025 
and are projected to reach $5.4 trillion in 2025, up from $3 tril-
lion in 2014.2 In 2018, eighteen percent of the national economy 
was spent on healthcare.3 It is no surprise that this large volume 
of economic activity has led fraudsters to view healthcare as a 
lucrative field for illegal activity.4 The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (FBI) states that the costs associated with healthcare 
fraud amount to tens of billions of dollars a year5 and are esti-
mated to increase in the future as people live longer, which in 
turn will increase the demand for Medicare benefits.6 
 The impact of healthcare fraud is significant and wide 
reaching.7 The following parties may face the financial conse-
quences: (1) insurance holders who pay higher premiums and out-
of-pocket expenses while receiving reduced benefits and coverage; 
(2) businesses that pay increasing premiums to provide healthcare 

1 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2016), National Health Ex-
penditures 2017 Highlights, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and 
-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads 
/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUX2-CNU9]. 
2 Id. 
3 Peter G. Peterson Found., Key Drivers of the Debt, https://www.pgpf.org 
/the-fiscal-and-economic-challenge/drivers [https://perma.cc/PTA5-5QR7].  
4 See generally Consumer Info & Action, NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-FRAUD 
ASS’N (2016), https://www.nhcaa.org/resources/health-care-anti-fraud-resources 
/consumer-info-action.aspx [https://perma.cc/K2L8-UNFB].  
5 Rooting Out Healthcare Fraud is Central to the Well-Being of Both Our 
Citizens and The Overall Economy (2016), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/white_collar/health-care-fraud [https:// 
perma.cc/QB3G-VHW9]. In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Justice recovered 
$2.4 billion from healthcare fraud at the federal level. Justice Department Recov-
ers Over $3.7 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-depart 
ment-recovers-over-37-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https:// 
perma.cc/W75K-6WJ2]. 
6 Federal Crimes Report 2010–2011, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2012), 
https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2010-2011 
[https://perma.cc/VP7Y-VR2X].  
7 See NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N, supra note 4.  
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to their employees, resulting in an overall increased cost of doing 
business; and (3) taxpayers who pay more to cover healthcare ex-
penditures in public health plans.8 Beyond monetary damages, 
healthcare fraud can also place patients at risk of serious physical 
harm, unnecessary procedures, unapproved drugs, or overpre-
scribed diagnostic tests and antibiotics.9 The vast amounts of 
sensitive medical and financial information included in each pa-
tient’s medical records are an area also tempting to fraudsters.10 
 Due to troublesome increases in healthcare fraud, U.S. 
federal and state law enforcement agencies have made healthcare 
fraud prosecution a primary focus.11 Under the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010, for example, the 
Obama Administration provided an additional $350 million for 
healthcare fraud prevention and enforcement efforts.12 
 While the FBI is the primary investigative agency in the 
fight against healthcare fraud, it coordinates its efforts with the 
Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General 
(HHS-OIG), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) Criminal Investigation Division, and various state 
and local agencies.13 However, despite more funding and a more 
focused and integrative effort by multiple government entities in 

8 Id. 
9 Id.  
10 See Health Care Fraud Unit, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice 
.gov/criminal-fraud/health-care-fraud-unit [https://perma.cc/9XF6-RBYH].  
11 Id. For example, Medicare Fraud Strike Forces have been in action for 
over ten years. These Strike Forces are modeled on a cross-agency collabora-
tive approach to investigations and resources, including a partnering of the FBI, 
the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General 
(HHS-OIG), the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Center for Pro-
gram Integrity (CPI), U.S. Attorney’s offices, law enforcement agencies and 
sometimes the Drug Enforcement Agency and Internal Revenue Service. See id.  
12 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (amending various sections of the U.S. Code including the 
False Claims Act and the Anti-Kickback statute); The Affordable Care Act 
and Fighting Fraud (2016), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., https:// 
www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/health-care-fraud-and-abuse-control-pro 
gram-protects-consumers-and-taxpayers-combating-health-care [https://perma 
.cc/98N9-AEUC].  
13 Federal Crimes Report 2010–2011, supra note 6.  
2020] INVESTIGATING HEALTHCARE FRAUD 483 
the last few years, the threat of healthcare fraud remains high.14 
This is evidenced by record-setting dollar amounts in recent health-
care fraud scheme takedowns, including opioid-related schemes.15 
 The goal of this analysis is to shed light on healthcare fraud 
schemes as well as present solutions to help control it. An analy-
sis of the scope of such fraud schemes highlights the importance 
of effectively combating them. Educating the public is an important 
step towards detecting and preventing this fraud in the first place. 
 This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, the scope of 
healthcare fraud is introduced through the explanation of vari-
ous schemes and review of recent cases. In Part II, major federal 
civil and criminal laws and related regulations applicable to 
healthcare fraud are analyzed. 
I.TYPES OF HEALTHCARE FRAUD SCHEMES 
 The largest anti-healthcare fraud organization, the National 
Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (“NHCAA”), defines health-
care fraud in general terms as an intentional deception or mis-
representation that could result in unauthorized benefit.16 There 
are different types of healthcare fraud schemes that exist. While 
the following discussion is not intended to be all-inclusive, it 
highlights the most prevalent healthcare fraud schemes. These 
include billing schemes, kickbacks, medical identity theft, fraud 
against Medicare and Medicaid, hospital fraud, fraud by service 
providers, and fraud by pharmaceutical companies.17 
A.Billing Schemes 
 According to the NHCAA, most healthcare fraud is commit-
ted by organized criminals and the small minority of healthcare 

14 See id. 
15 On its website, the Department of Justice lists many of its charges, the 
number of defendants, and the amount of falsely billed healthcare claims. Many 
of the recent cases involved pharmacies, drug diversion, and controlled sub-
stances. Largest Health Care Fraud Enforcement Action in Department of Justice 
History Resulted in 76 Doctors Charged and 84 Opioid Cases Involving More 
Than 13 Million Illegal Dosages of Opioids, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2018), https:// 
www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/health-care-fraud-unit/june-2015-takedown 
[https://perma.cc/LXR7-C6KH].  
16 NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N, supra note 4. 
17 Id.  
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providers that are dishonest.18 Common examples of billing 
fraud include: 
1. billing for services or equipment not rendered; 
2. billing for unnecessary services or equipment; 
3. double billing for the same service or equipment; 
4. billing for phantom patients, or patients who are 
deceased; 
5. billing for old services as if they were new; 
6. “unbundling,” that is, billing separately for services 
or equipment included in a combined or bundled rate; 
7. “upcoding,” that is, billing for a service or piece of 
equipment at a higher rate than was actually pro-
vided; 
8. attempting to get reimbursed for non-covered services 
by fraudulently labeling them as covered services; and 
9. billing for a canceled service, that is, a medication, 
procedure, or service that was prearranged and then 
canceled is still billed.19 
 As seen by the above list, billing schemes can be very diverse. 
Some cases of billing fraud can be easily detected if a patient is 
aware of this type of fraud and carefully reviews their benefits 
statements. Other types of billing fraud are not easily identified. 
For example, if a patient reviews a hospital bill, a double-billing 
error might be readily apparent, while overbilling might not be as 
easily detectable. 
 In the largest healthcare fraud enforcement action to date, 
601 individuals—including 165 doctors, nurses, and other licensed 
medical professionals—were charged for their alleged participation 
in a false billing scheme amounting to more than $2 billion.20 

18 What Does Health Care Fraud Look Like, NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-
FRAUD ASS’N, https://www.nhcaa.org/news/what-does-health-care-fraud-look 
-like.aspx [https://perma.cc/HQV5-3UQG].  
19 Id.; Ron Cresswell, Health Care Fraud: 5 Common Health Schemes, 
ACFEINSIGHTS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://acfeinsights.squarespace.com/acfe-in 
sights/2018/12/12/health-care-fraud-5-common-billing-schemes [https://perma 
.cc/JB8R-DUFR].  
20 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., National Health Care Fraud Takedown 
Results in Charges Against 601 Individuals Responsible for Over $2 Billion in 

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Allegedly, the defendants took part in schemes to submit claims 
to Medicaid, Medicare, TRICARE (a health insurance program 
for veterans of the Armed Forces and their family members), and 
private insurance companies for medically unnecessary treat-
ments and, often, never provided.21 In these schemes, patient 
recruiters, beneficiaries, and other co-conspirators purportedly 
paid cash in return for supplying beneficiary information to pro-
viders.22 With this information, the providers could then submit 
fraudulent bills to Medicare.23 Particularly significant in this 
case is the number of medical professionals charged, as almost 
every healthcare fraud scheme involving Medicare or Medicaid 
requires the participation of a corrupt medical professional.24 
B.Kickbacks 
 Another common fraudulent scheme is the payment of “kick-
backs” in return for influencing the provision of healthcare.25 Kick-
backs can corrupt a medical provider’s decision-making and make 
profit, rather than a patient’s welfare, the healthcare provider’s 
primary goal.26 Kickbacks can lead to inappropriate medical care, 
including incorrect hospitalization, surgery, tests, medications, 
and equipment.27 Some of the largest kickback cases have oc-
curred in the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).28  
The Veterans’ Health Administration [of the VA] is the largest 
integrated health care system in the United States, providing 

Fraud Losses (June 28, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/national-health 
-care-fraud-takedown-results-charges-against-601-individuals-responsible-over 
[https://perma.cc/T5VG-Q5JG].  
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Fried et al., Individual and Institutional Corruption in European and US 
Healthcare: Overview and Link of Various Corruption Typologies (2018), https:// 
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5940713/ [https://perma.cc/947B-Y6S8].  
26 Id. 
27 See id. 
28 See Former Department of Veterans Affairs Official Sentenced to 46 Months 
In Prison for Taking $1.2 Million in Kickbacks, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/former-department-veterans-affairs-official 
-sentenced-46-months-prison-taking-12-million [https://perma.cc/9HFT-NP95].  
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care at 1,255 health care facilities, including 170 VA Medical 
Centers and 1,074 outpatient sites of care of varying complexity 
(VHA outpatient clinics) to over 9 million veterans enrolled in 
the VA health care program.29  
If you consider that kickback schemes involving specific 
contracts and referrals, this system presents a huge opportunity 
for fraudsters.30 In the below example, an indictment alleges that 
defendants made materially false statements and omissions in 
the course of applying for a $59 million contract with the VA.31 
Contracts that large are not common in most healthcare systems.32 
But a contract with the VA national system can be worth tens of 
millions of dollars.33 
 Former VA podiatry chief Anthony Lazzarino and Sunrise 
Shoes CEO Peter Wong were charged with healthcare fraud, con-
spiracy to pay and receive kickbacks on medical referrals, and 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud.34 The indictment alleged that 
between March 2008 and February 2015, Lazzarino and Wong 
engaged in a scheme to defraud the VA by billing the VHA for 
custom work and services that were prescribed but not supplied 
in shoes delivered to veterans.35 Specifically, the two men teamed 
up to bill the VA for nearly $1.7 million worth of specialized shoes, 
some of them costing as much as $1,682 a pair, while veterans 
received only “off-the-shelf” products from Sunrise Shoes.36 
 In addition, the indictment alleges that Lazzarino referred 
patients directly to Sunrise Shoes, in violation of VA policy, and 
agreed with Wong to offer kickbacks in return for such referrals.37 
Specifically, Lazzarino made sure veterans were steered to Sunrise 

29 Veterans Health Administration, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., https://www 
.va.gov/health/aboutvha.asp [https://perma.cc/7SGY-76JD].  
30 See A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud & Abuse Laws, OFF. OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws 
.asp [https://perma.cc/9JX4-HXWC].  
31 Sealed Indictment at 11–12, Lazzarino, No.2:16-CR-0237 TLN (E.D. 
Cal. Dec. 15, 2016), ECF No.1.  
32 Id.  
33 As discussed earlier in this section, the Veterans’ Health Administration 
[of the VA] is the largest integrated healthcare system in the United States. 
34 Sealed Indictment at 18, Lazzarino, No.2:16-CR-0237 TLN (E.D. Cal. 
Dec. 15, 2016), ECF No.1.  
35 Id. at 3–4.  
36 Id. at 3–5.  
37 Id. at 6–10.  
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by handing them the store’s business card and making disparag-
ing comments about other vendors.38 
 Further, the indictment alleges that Lazzarino and Wong 
agreed to make materially false statements and omissions to the 
VA regarding where the shoes were manufactured in the course 
of applying for a contract with the VA.39 At the time of this writ-
ing, neither party has been convicted on these alleged charges.40 
“If convicted, Lazzarino and Wong face a maximum statutory 
penalty of 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine for each health-
care fraud count, and five years in prison and a $250,000 fine for 
each of the two conspiracy counts.”41 
C.Medical Identity Theft 
 Increased cybersecurity threats and identity theft have 
led to a rise in an expensive and dangerous offspring in the 
healthcare sector: medical identity theft.42 According to the De-
partment of Health and Human Services, medical identity theft 
is one of the fastest-growing areas of healthcare fraud.43 In this 
type of fraud, medical information is often stolen by employees 
at medical facilities to sell on the black market for a profit or by 
an uninsured individual who needs medical treatment.44 Thieves 
may also hack into pacemakers, insulin pumps, medical databases 
or even break into medical facilities.45 Medical identity thieves 

38 Id. at 4.  
39 Id. at 3–5.  
40 Id. at 17–18.  
41 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former VA Podiatry Chief and Sunrise 
Shoes CEO Indicted for Health Care Fraud Scheme (Dec. 16, 2016), https:// 
www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr/former-va-podiatry-chief-and-sunrise-shoes-ceo 
-indicted-health-care-fraud-scheme [https://perma.cc/LS5Q-N9ZE].  
42 Michael Ollove, The Rise of Medical Identity Theft in Healthcare, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 7, 2014), https://khn.org/news/rise-of-indentity-theft/ [https:// 
perma.cc/PFX3-4LGY].  
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 By the Numbers: Fraud Statistics, COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD (2016), 
http://www.insurancefraud.org/statistics.htm [https://perma.cc/W4NW-45MW]. 
See generally Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and 
Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solution, 30 SANTA CLARA 
COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139 (2014). 
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often use false or stolen personal medical data to create claims 
and bill the victim’s health insurance company.46 
 Not only is medical identity theft very costly for the victim, 
it also causes great stress.47 According to a survey by the Ponemon 
Institute, 65 percent of victims paid an average of $13,500 to 
repair the harm done by this type of theft.48 In addition to the 
significant costs, it is time-consuming to resolve medical identity 
theft.49 In another survey by Ponemon Institute, victims of med-
ical identity theft spent 200 hours correcting their compromised 
data.50 But worse, a victim’s medical history can be permanently 
altered, with diseases or injuries the victim never had falsely en-
tered into records, further harming the victim by having the wrong 
medical information (for example, incorrect blood type) on file.51 
 Unfortunately, many people who are victims of medical iden-
tity theft may not find out until months later.52 “Few consumers 
[even] know what medical identity theft is or how much this crime 
can damage their credit and health.”53 Only 15 percent of adults 
state that they are familiar with medical identity theft.54 Of those, 
only 38 percent could correctly define “medical identity.”55 Tar-
gets of medical identity theft particularly include the elderly and 
disabled, who are less likely to notice that anything is wrong.56 
Individuals can protect their information from being stolen in the 
first place by being careful when discarding items containing health 
information, such as billing statements and prescription bottles.57 
The explanation of benefits documents should also be carefully 
reviewed to spot potential red flags.58 

46 Wellington, supra note 45, at 151. 
47 COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD, supra note 45.  
48 Fifth Annual Study on Identity Theft (2016), PONEMON INST., http://medi 
dfraud.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2014_Medical_ID_Theft_Study1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8X5D-6DS3].  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD, supra note 45. 
53 Id. 
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 Michelino Mancini, Medical Identity Theft in the Emergency Department: 
Awareness is Crucial, NCBI (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pmc/articles/PMC4251251/ [https://perma.cc/B5C6-FCYH]. 
57 PONEMON INST., supra note 48. 
58 Id.  
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 “Most cases of medical identity theft occur through the 
emergency department [in hospitals].”59 Doctors working in hos-
pitals can also be victims of medical identity theft, for example, 
when blank prescription forms are stolen and then sold in the 
black market.60 In 2011, the Latin Kings gang from New York 
was found to be trafficking stolen prescription forms with forged 
signatures.61 These prescriptions, mostly for the addictive pain-
killer Oxycodone, were sold by the gang nationwide for $100 to 
$300 to users seeking drugs.62 The prescriptions were stolen from 
local New York hospitals due to poor controls and safeguards, and 
the incident was part of a large national trafficking scheme in-
volving up to 1.4 million prescription forms.63 
 In an attempt to address medical identity theft, new tech-
nologies have been developed that can help health insurers reduce 
the chance of being defrauded.64 Most insurers use basic tools 
such as automated red flags and business rules.65 But advanced 

59 John Dumfries, Healthcare Fraud and Medical Identity Theft in Canada 
and USA (Oct. 9, 2012), THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS CAN., http:// 
www.wsuccess.com/iia/healthcare_fraud_bw.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9B4-DYL9] 
(alteration in quote).  
60 See Shantanu Agrawal & Peter Budetti, Physician Medical Identity Theft, 
307 JAMA 459 (Feb. 1, 2012), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article 
-abstract/1104942 [https://perma.cc/7RZR-GCFG] (“Medical identity theft is the 
appropriation or misuse of a patient’s or physician’s unique medical identify-
ing information to obtain or bill public or private payers for fraudulent medical 
goods or services. For physicians, this information includes the National Pro-
vider Identifier (NPI), Tax Identification Number (TIN), and medical licen-
sure information.”).  
61 Robert Lewis & Will Van Sant, NY: Up to 1.4M Prescription Forms Stolen, 
NEWSDAY (Oct. 23, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.newsday.com/news/health/ny 
-up-to-1-4m-prescription-forms-stolen-1.3265916 [https://perma.cc/R85Y-W2F5]. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 For an example of technology being used to help to detect hospital fraud, 
see, e.g. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on 
a Modern-Day Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. SCI. 343, 349 (2010) (“Health Out-
comes Technologies was a software company that developed computer-based 
health outcomes measurement and disease management systems. Using this 
technology, the company was able to identify hospitals that had billed for bac-
terial pneumonia at rates far in excess of the national average....”). 
65 COALITION AGAINST INS. FRAUD, THE STATE OF INSURANCE FRAUD: A 
STUDY OF INSURER USE, STRATEGIES AND PLANS FOR ANTI-FRAUD TECHNOLOGY 4 
(Nov. 2016), http://www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/State_of_Insurance 
_Fraud_Technology2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/39KB-NETS].  
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tools (such as link analysis, predictive modeling, text mining, and 
geo-mapping) are not as commonly used by insurers.66 More than 
half of insurers cite a lack of IT resources as the main stumbling 
block in implementing anti-fraud technology.67 
D.Hospital Frauds 
 Lack of oversight and an overly complex system has led to 
the widespread occurrence of healthcare-related fraud in the hospi-
tal industry.68 The types of fraud committed relating to hospitals 
are multifold.69 These frauds can be divided into frauds committed 
“by” hospitals and frauds committed “against” hospitals.70 Some 
of the more typical schemes of both types are discussed next. 
1.Unnecessary Procedures 
 When hospitals commit fraud, it is often in the form of un-
necessary procedures.71 These frauds can be attributed to several 
different reasons.72 For example, hospitals desire to improve their 
reputation by having completed a large number of procedures and, 

66 Id. at 4. 
67 Id. at 6.  
68 See Passard Dean, Josseibel Vazquez-Gonzalez & Lucy Fricker, Causes 
and Challenges of Healthcare Fraud in the US, 4 INT’L J. BUS. SOC. SCI. No. 
14 at 1–3 (Nov. 2013), https://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_14_November 
_2013/1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SGX-DY24] (discussing the “complex environment 
of the healthcare industry” and “low perceived risk of getting caught” as factors 
contributing to the “widespread problem” of healthcare fraud in the United States). 
69 See Dana McWay & Seena Kurian, Busting Bad Medicine: A Call to Ac-
tion Addressing Healthcare, Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, 88 J. AM. HEALTH INFO. 
MGMT. ASS’N 32 no. 10 (Oct. 2017), http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=302311# 
.XY5TmEZKhyw [https://perma.cc/QH8Z-M5K2] (discussing common types of 
healthcare fraud committed by providers). 
70 See James Byrd, Paige Powell & Douglas Smith, Health Care Fraud: An 
Introduction to a Major Cost Issue, 14 J. ACCT. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y, 521, 528 
(2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2285860 [https://perma.cc/T7VZ-QXVE] (“In 
addition to fraud committed by health care providers, individuals commit frauds 
against providers and insurers....”). 
71 See McWay & Kurian, supra note 69 (listing “[b]illing for services that 
were not medically necessary” as one of the common types of healthcare fraud). 
72 See generally Dean et al., supra note 68 (exploring multiple aspects of the 
healthcare industry that makes it prone to fraud); see also Byrd et al., supra 
note 70, at 529 (stating that motivations to commit fraud in the healthcare 
industry “are as varied as the number of providers and health care patients”). 
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therefore, appearing to be more proficient at performing them.73 
Stringent regulations from the federal Medicare and Medicaid 
programs also represent reasons for doctors and hospitals to 
commit fraud against their patients.74 But perhaps the largest 
pressure is the desire to meet financial goals and create the ad-
ditional revenues generated by billing for these procedures.75 When 
profits are a factor, hospitals can habitually upgrade patients to 
more expensive therapies even when lower cost alternatives offer a 
better outcome for the patient.76 Also, as the demand for hospital 
services has declined with individuals seeking less costly alter-
natives, hospitals have sought additional ways of generating reve-
nues.77 Unnecessary aggressive chemotherapy, cancer treatments, 
infusion therapies, and cardiac procedures are some examples of 
unnecessary procedures performed by hospitals.78 The following 

73 See United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 
370, 374 (5th Cir. 2004) (Complainant stated that “in apparent pursuit of 
prestige by being industry leaders in terms of number of heart transplants 
performed, Defendants performed unnecessary heart transplants”); REBECCA 
SALTIEL BUSCH, HEALTHCARE FRAUD, AUDITING AND DETECTION GUIDE 9 (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d ed. 2012) (listing “[c]ompetitive advantage” as one of the 
targets of healthcare fraud).  
74 Byrd et al., supra note 70, at 527–28 (stating that to avoid “fines or pen-
alties” or “closure of a facility” by Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, a 
provider may conduct “unnecessary services”).  
75 Aaron E. Carroll, The High Costs of Unnecessary Care, 318 JAMA no. 9 
1748, 1749 (2017), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2662877 
[https://perma.cc/R4XW-NQFR] (noting a “recent survey found that more than 70 
[percent] of physicians believe that physicians are more likely to perform unneces-
sary procedures when they profit from them” and the reimbursement system 
that increases revenue for healthcare providers when they provide more care).  
76 Shefali Luthra, Infusion Treatments—Needed or Not—Can Deplete Patients’ 
Wallets, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (AUG. 2, 2019), https://khn.org/news/infusion 
-treatments-for-low-iron-can-deplete-patients-wallets/ [https://perma.cc/2CTL 
-PX7Z] (noting how Medicare and private insurance’s reimbursement system 
gives providers an incentive to pick the newer, more expensive option). 
77 See Melanie Evans, U.S. Hospital Profits Fall as Labor Costs Grow and 
Patient Mix Shifts, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj 
.com/articles/u-s-hospital-profits-fall-as-labor-costs-grow-and-patient-mix-shifts 
-1524495601 [https://perma.cc/U4FP-83PU].  
78 See Luthra, supra note 76 (finding hospital use of unnecessary infu-
sions); Mustaqeem Siddiqui & Vincent Rajkumar, The High Cost of Cancer Drugs 
and What We Can Do About It, 87 MAYO CLINIC STET. 935, 938 (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538397/pdf/main.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/L6QJ-5Z6X] (“Physicians receiving more generous Medicare reim-
bursements ... used more costly [cancer] treatment regimens.”). 
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case demonstrates how one hospital extracted funds illegally 
from Medicare and Medicaid by performing unnecessary proce-
dures on its patients. 
 In 2014, Saint Joseph London Hospital agreed to pay the 
U.S. government $16.5 million to settle “civil allegations that it 
submitted false or fraudulent claims to the Medicare and Kentucky 
Medicaid programs for a variety of medically unnecessary heart 
procedures.”79 Between 2008 and 2011, “several doctors working 
at the hospital performed numerous invasive cardiac procedures”—
“which included coronary stents, pacemakers, coronary artery 
bypass graft surgeries (“CABGS”), and diagnostic catheteriza-
tions”—“on Medicare and Medicaid patients who did not need 
them.”80 
 To better understand this example of hospital fraud, it 
helps to consider a specific case of a doctor involved in the Saint 
Joseph London case. One of the doctors at that hospital, Dr. Anis 
Chalhoub, was sentenced by U.S. District Court “to serve 42 months 
in federal prison” and pay monetary fines and damages for health-
care fraud.81 
In April 2018, a federal jury returned a guilty verdict, after hear-
ing evidence that Dr. Chalhoub defrauded Medicare, Medicaid, 
and other insurers by implanting medically unnecessary pace-
makers in his patients and causing the unnecessary procedures 
and follow-up care to be billed to health insurance programs. 
Between 2007 and 2011, Dr. Chalhoub implanted approximately 
234 pacemakers in patients at St. Joseph London hospital. The 
evidence at trial showed that dozens of those patients’ pacemak-
ers were medically unnecessary under well-established national 
guidelines and Medicare coverage rules. A number of patients 
testified at trial that Dr. Chalhoub pressured them into get-
ting the procedures [and misled them] about their health con-
ditions. For instance, several patients recalled Dr. Chalhoub 
telling them that they might die without a pacemaker. Sinus 
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79 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Saint Joseph London Hospital to Pay 
$16.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations of Unnecessary Heart 
Procedures (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edky/pr/saint-joseph 
-london-hospital-pay-165-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations [https://per 
ma.cc/P8NQ-Q9Z3]. 
80 Id.  
81 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, London Cardiologist Sentenced to 
42 Months for Health Care Fraud (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao 
-edky/pr/london-cardiologist-sentenced-42-months-health-care-fraud [https:// 
perma.cc/SC9Y-ZVAQ]. 
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node dysfunction, the diagnosis Dr. Chalhoub gave the patients, 
is a non-fatal condition. The jury also heard evidence that 
Medicare, Medicaid, and other insurers suffered hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in losses from Dr. Chalhoub’s unneces-
sary procedures.82 
 A so-called “hospital-physician transaction,” which is any 
cooperation between a hospital and a physician, can also have 
the potential for healthcare fraud.83 According to the Stark Law 
and the False Claims Act (both discussed below), hospitals are pro-
hibited from submitting claims to Medicare for patients referred 
to the hospital by physicians who have a “prohibited financial 
relationship” with the hospital.84 These parties could potentially 
negotiate for a transaction for less or more than fair market value.85 
A legitimate hospital-physician relationship is one where the physi-
cian is paid fair market value, meaning the amount paid in an 
arm’s-length transaction.86 Hospital-physician transactions can 
be complex, such that illegal activities are not always clear-cut.87 
 In the following case, involving an illegal hospital-physician 
transaction, however, the transactions were clearly not paid at 
fair market value.88 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) obtained 
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82 Id. 
83 See Leigh Walton et al., Hospitals Employing Physicians: A Practical 
Guide to Buying Physician Practices and Compensating Employed Doctors, 22 
HEALTH L. 1, 5 (2009) (“In an effort to prevent fraud and abuse in the health-
care system, federal and state laws impose significant restrictions on the manner 
in which hospitals compensate physicians for the items and services they provide 
to the hospital.”).  
84 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012) (also called the Stark Law); False 
Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).  
85 See Walton et al., supra note 83, at 9 (stating to avoid considerations of 
fraud “it is critical that a hospital purchasing a physician practice buy the 
practice for a price that does not exceed fair market value”). 
86 Lisa Ohrin, Daryl Johnson Macc & Lawrence Vernaglia, Fair Market 
Value and Commercial Reasonableness in Hospital/Physician Transactions: 
What’s the Difference?, Roundtable Webinar Discussion, American Health 
Lawyers Association (Jan. 3, 2012), https://www.healthlawyers.org/Events/Webi 
nars/RoundtableDiscussions/2011/Documents/roundtable_discussion_slides_0
10312.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A3Q-TFGY]. 
87 See Walton et al., supra note 83, at 9. 
88 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Resolves $237 Mil-
lion False Claims Act Judgment against South Carolina Hospital that Made 
Illegal Payments to Referring Physicians (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.justice 
.gov/opa/pr/united-states-resolves-237-million-false-claims-act-judgment-against 
-south-carolina-hospital [https://perma.cc/JJM4-SGA4]. 
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a $237 million judgment against South Carolina–based Tuomey 
Healthcare System Inc., which was accused of having a referral 
agreement with physicians.89 Tuomey entered into contracts with 
19 physicians that required the physicians to refer their outpa-
tient procedures to Tuomey to avoid losing lucrative outpatient 
procedure referrals to a surgery center.90 In exchange, Tuomey 
paid the physicians “compensation that far exceeded fair market 
value and included part of the money it received from Medicare 
for the referred procedures”.91 The DOJ “reached a $1 million 
settlement with Ralph J. Cox III”, the former CEO of Tuomey 
Healthcare System, for his involvement in the hospital’s illegal 
Medicare and Medicaid billings for services referred by physi-
cians with whom the hospital had improper financial relation-
ships.92 “Under the terms of the settlement agreement”, Cox was 
also “excluded from participating in federal healthcare programs, 
including management or administrative services paid for by federal 
healthcare programs, for four years.”93 
2.Embezzlement 
 Healthcare frauds are also committed against hospitals.94 
These often take the form of embezzlement, where an unauthorized 
benefit is shifted from the hospital to the fraudster.95 Employees, 
from secretaries to CEOs, can become fraudsters and embezzle 
funds from hospitals just as easily as they can in any other busi-
ness.96 When people are placed in positions of trust over large 
sums of money, such as is the case in hospitals, the risk of embez-
zlement is amplified.97 Also, hospitals are often not-for-profit 
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89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See Byrd et al., supra note 70, at 529.  
95 See generally Deborah R. Mathis & Michael S. Lewis, Employee Embez-
zlement: A Growing Problem, 25 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 146 (2009) (discussing 
embezzlement in healthcare).  
96 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ex-CEO of Imperial Valley Hospital 
Pleads Guilty to Fraud and Embezzlement (July 31, 2013), https://archives.fbi 
.gov/archives/sandiego/press-releases/2013/ex-ceo-of-imperial-valley-hospital 
-pleads-guilty-to-fraud-and-embezzlement [https://perma.cc/ZJU9-2X8Q]. 
97 See Joseph T. Wells, Why Employees Commit Fraud, J. ACCT. (Feb. 1, 
2001), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2001/feb/whyemployees 
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organizations, which means an increased risk of embezzlement, as 
hospitals often have fewer employees and less segregation of du-
ties.98 The following two cases highlight how employees of hospi-
tals embezzled funds from employers through various methods. 
 In the first case, William Roe, CFO of Danbury Hospital 
in Hartford, Connecticut, set up a fake software company and 
then approved payments totaling $95,000 for services never per-
formed.99 He also fraudulently received $46,166 when he altered 
the appraisal value of his home when Danbury Hospital agreed to 
pay the difference between the sales price and the appraised value 
as part of his hiring agreement as CFO.100 He was sentenced to 
33 months in prison.101 Interestingly, prior to working at Danbury 
Hospital, Roe worked for St. Rita Hospital in Ohio where he stole 
$75,000 using the same software company scheme.102 If the ear-
lier hospital had decided to prosecute, perhaps the crimes at the 
second hospital would have been prevented. 
 In the second case, Eduora McDaniel, a VA employee, and 
Angela Hunter, co-owner of Divine Iron Works, generated pur-
chase orders for fictitious goods and services.103 “They [allegedly] 
entered into an agreement to split the VA’s payments for goods 
and services Hunter’s company never provided.”104 Divine Iron 
Works “was effectively defunct from January 2011 to December 

commitfraud.html [https://perma.cc/HJ9X-PUJQ] (“If one person controls both 
the books and the assets, the ability to commit fraud is limited only by that 
person’s imagination.”). 
98 See Mathis & Lewis, supra note 95, at 147 (“Practices that are able to 
segregate duties ... will be less vulnerable to embezzlement.”). 
99 John Pirro, Former Danbury Hospital Exec Faces Sentencing for Embez-
zlement, NEWS TIMES (July 10, 2011), http://www.newstimes.com/news/article 
/Former-Danbury-Hospital-exec-faces-sentencing-for-1460230.php [https://perma 
.cc/GW74-BD78]. 
100 Id. 
101 Edmond Mahoney, Former Danbury Hospital CFO Sentenced In Fraud, 
HARTFORD COURANT (July 11, 2011), https://www.courant.com/health/hc-xpm 
-2011-07-11-hc-hospital-fraud-0712-20110711-story.html [https://perma.cc 
/N2RK-YH72]. 
102 Id. 
103 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, VA Employee and Former Vendor 
Charged with Fraud in Alleged Bogus Invoice Scheme (June 12, 2018), https:// 
www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/va-employee-and-former-vendor-charged-fraud 
-alleged-bogus-invoice-scheme [https://perma.cc/YW2T-TU4M]. 
104 Id. 
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2014 and provided no actual goods or services.”105 “[A]s a VA 
prosthetics representative, McDaniel had the authority to obtain 
prosthetic goods and services if a [VA] physician found them 
medically necessary” and she had a government-issued Visa credit 
card for this purpose.106 “McDaniel [allegedly] created bogus pur-
chase orders for Hunter’s company, which Hunter used to obtain 
payment on McDaniel’s government credit cards.”107 
3.Unauthorized Practice 
 Practicing, attempting to practice or offering to practice a 
regulated healthcare profession without a valid license can be a 
felony offense carrying minimum mandatory jail penalties (for 
example, see Florida Statute § 456.065(2)(d)).108 The following case 
illustrates how an unlicensed individual posing as a licensed 
medical professional can endanger patients’ health. 
 Juan Manuel Perez falsely held himself out as a Licensed 
Vocational Nurse (LVN).109 In January 2015, Perez obtained 
employment with Cleveland Health Care LLC in McAllen, Texas, 
falsely claiming to be a LVN.110 Perez presented a license number, 
which allegedly belonged to another individual with the same 
name.111 However, Perez was not licensed by the Texas Board of 
Nursing and was never an LVN.112 From January 2015 through 
July 2016, Perez conducted patient home visits and provided 
medical services while employed with Cleveland Health Care.113 
Perez later utilized the stolen identification to gain employment 
with various other area healthcare institutions, including Harl-
ingen Medical Center and Valley Baptist Medical Center.114 Perez 
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108 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.065(2)(d) (West 2001).  
109 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., San Benito Man Heads to Prison for 
Posing as Licensed Vocational Nurse (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.justice.gov 
/usao-sdtx/pr/san-benito-man-heads-prison-posing-licensed-vocational-nurse 
[https://perma.cc/4FAV-GN52]. 
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114 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., San Benito Man Arrested for Posing as 
LVN (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/san-benito-man-ar 
rested-posing-lvn [https://perma.cc/9BUK-HTJT].  
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received a mandatory 24-month prison sentence in connection with 
identity misappropriation.115 
4.Pharmaceutical and Durable Medical Equipment Fraud 
 Some of the largest and most complex fraud cases are those 
involving pharmaceuticals and durable medical equipment.116 
Nationally, there has been a focus on the misuse of and addic-
tion to opioids and other narcotics.117 In fact, in one month (June 
2018), the Attorney General and the Department of Health and 
Human Services announced that 162 defendants, including 76 
doctors, had been charged for their roles in schemes involving 
opioids and other narcotics.118 The year-over-year trends are stag-
gering: the DOJ reported that while 90 defendants were charged 
in 2014, 301 defendants were charged in 2016, and 601 defend-
ants were charged in 2018.119 Opioid-related fraud losses grew 
from $260 million in 2014 to $2 billion in 2018.120 
 Over half of the states reported narcotic-related fraud cases 
from 2018.121 Examples include an indictment in California, where 
two podiatrists were accused of providing pre-printed prescriptions, 
regardless of need, in exchange for kickbacks, prostitutes, and 
expensive meals.122 These prescriptions allegedly amounted to more 
than $250 million in fraudulent claims.123 An additional indictment 
in Texas claimed that fraudulent prescriptions were used to 
order over one million pills of hydrocodone and oxycodone.124 In 
this instance, 48 individuals, including a pharmacy chain owner 

115 Id. 
116 See, e.g., Opioid Crisis Response Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-271, 132 
Stat. 4012 (2018), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/criminal/ 
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and pharmacist, were charged with fraud.125 In a 2018 case, a 
Delaware physician was charged with unlawfully prescribing 
more than two million units of oxycodone.126 In total, 30 states 
and 58 federal districts reported cases in 2018.127 
 Fraudsters have also targeted durable medical equipment 
(DME).128 DME is medical equipment that is prescribed by a treat-
ing physician to be used in the home or homelike setting on a re-
peated basis, such as walkers, wheelchairs, and back braces.129 
Fraud related to DME is not new; according to the Government 
Accounting Office, DME and medical facilities accounted for 41 
percent of all criminal case subjects in 2005 and about 40 per-
cent of all criminal cases brought under the FCA in 2010.130 
 Fraud related to DME has evolved with healthcare. Over 
the past decade, healthcare services have moved from inpatient 
settings to clinic settings and then to telemedicine, which allows 
providers to diagnose and prescribe medicine to patients via tele-
phone and video.131 In April 2019, the DOJ reported the indictment 
of 24 defendants, including CEOs and COOs of five telemedicine 
companies, the owners of dozens of DME companies and three 
licensed medical professionals.132 In short, the government believed 
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128 For example, in 2011, one of the largest national DME suppliers, Hill-
Rom Company, paid $41.8 million to settle allegations that it submitted false 
claims over an eight-year period related to medical bed equipment. Hill-Rom 
Company, Inc. Will Pay $41.8 Million to Resolve Federal Healthcare Fraud 
Investigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 27, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/ar 
chive/usao/tne/news/2011/September/092711A%20Hill-Rom%20Settlement.html 
[https://perma.cc/J2PK-K9PZ]. 
129 Durable Medical Equipment (DME), HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.health 
care.gov/glossary/durable-medical-quipment-DME [https://perma.cc/88C8-H7N7]. 
130 Health Care Fraud: Types of Providers Involved in Medicare, Medicaid, 
and the Children’s Health Insurance, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Sept. 
2012), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-820 [https://perma.cc/8KR6-AW7V]. 
131 The Ultimate Telemedicine Guide: What is Telemedicine?, EVISIT (May 25, 
2018), https://evisit.com/resources/what-is-telemedicine/ [https://perma.cc/J5 
E2-PAVN]. 
132 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Indictments & Law Enforcement 
Actions in One of the Largest Health Care Fraud Schemes Involving Telemedi-
cine and Durable Medical Equipment Marketing Executives Results in Charges 
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that the indicted medical providers worked with telemedicine 
companies to provide elderly and disabled Medicare beneficiar-
ies with unneeded back, shoulder, and knee braces, resulting in 
a loss to Medicare of over one billion dollars.133 Allegedly, the 
telemarketers phoned Medicare beneficiaries, promised free or 
low-cost orthopedic braces, had physicians who had not treated 
or evaluated the patients sign prescriptions for the braces, then 
sold the prescriptions to DME companies who shipped the braces 
and billed Medicare.134 It is believed that the fraudsters then 
laundered the money through shell companies to purchase cars, 
yachts, and property in the United States and abroad.135 
 In summary, the forms of healthcare fraud are vast. Many 
of the fraud cases described above involve similar and overlap-
ping themes. No matter the parties involved, the schemes often 
include behavior such as billing for services never provided, mis-
statements of facts, giving kickbacks, stealing information, and 
committing wire fraud.136 The following section discusses the laws 
enacted to control fraud in the medical industry. 
II.MAJOR FEDERAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAWS THAT 
RELATE TO HEALTHCARE FRAUD 
A.Federal False Claims Act 
 The Federal False Claims Act (FCA)137 was originally en-
acted in 1863 to protect the federal government from fraud perpe-
trated by unscrupulous Civil War contractors.138 Today the law 
is aimed at those responsible for the $100 billion or more in 

Against 24 Individuals Responsible for Over $1.2 Billion in Losses (Apr. 9, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-indictments-and-law-enforcement-actions 
-one-largest-health-care-fraud-schemes [https://perma.cc/NX5A-RUG9]. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 Federation of American Scientists, Bribery, Kickbacks, and Self-Dealing: 
An Overview of Honest Services Fraud and Issues for Congress, CONG. RES. 
SERV. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45479.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/3WQ6-D89M]. 
137 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018).  
138 The False Claims Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov 
/civil/false-claims-act [https://perma.cc/6A8S-ACLR]. 
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fraudulent activity diverted every year from federal healthcare, 
defense, and other programs.139 “In addition to ... monetary losses, 
fraud also ... erodes public confidence and raises questions about 
the government’s ability to manage its programs.”140 
 The current version of the FCA makes liable “[a]ny person 
who ... knowingly presents or causes to be presented ... a false or 
fraudulent claim [to the U.S. government] for payment or ap-
proval.”141 The law also imposes liability for making “false rec-
ord(s) or statement(s) ... [designed] to conceal, avoid, or decrease 
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the [United 
States] government.”142 

139 M. CRAIN, W. HOPWOOD, C. PACINI & G. YOUNG, THE ESSENTIALS OF 
FORENSIC ACCOUNTING 525 (2015). 
140 J. Morgan Phelps, The False Claims Act’s Public Disclosure Bar: Defin-
ing the Law Between Parasitic and Beneficial, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 247, 247 (1999). 
141 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2018). 
142 Id. § 3729(a)(2). Sections 3729(a)(1) and (2) are the most frequently used 
provision of the FCA. Section 3729(a) states in relevant part: 
Any person who— 
(A) Knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, ... a 
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; 
(B) Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a 
false record or statement material to a false or fraudu-
lent claim; 
(C) Conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), 
(B), (C), (D), (E), (F), or (G); 
(D) Has possession, custody, or control of property or money 
used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly 
delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that 
money or property; 
(E) Is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying 
receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government 
and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or 
delivers the receipt without completely knowing that 
the information on the receipt is true; 
(F) Knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obliga-
tion or debt, public property from an officer or employee 
of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, 
who lawfully may not sell or pledge property; or 
(G)  Knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, 
a false record or statement material to an obligation to 
pay or transmit money or property to the Government, 
or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly 
avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government,  

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 Many FCA violations involve submission of false information 
while presenting payments to the federal government.143 Two ex-
amples of false healthcare claims can be found in U.S. v. Rogan144 
and U.S. v. Cabrera-Diaz.145 Using a unique characteristic of the 
FCA known as the qui tam action, private citizens, rather than gov-
ernment attorneys, are allowed to challenge FCA violations.146 
 A qui tam plaintiff, also referred to as a qui tam relator or 
a whistleblower, is a private citizen who files a civil lawsuit 
against an alleged fraudster on behalf of himself and the US 
government.147 If the government does not pursue the action, the 
relator pursuing the case is entitled to “not less than 25 percent 
and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or 
settlement and shall be paid out of such proceeds.”148 In addi-
tion, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to collect from the defend-
ant reasonable attorneys’ fees, and expenses from pursuing the 
claim.149 In the event the defendant retaliates against the plain-
tiff through discharge, demotion, suspension, harassment, or dis-
crimination in any other manner, the plaintiff shall be entitled 
“to all relief necessary to make the [plaintiff] whole.”150 If the 
federal government intervenes in the lawsuit initiated by the qui 
tam relator, the latter is still entitled to “at least 15 percent but 
not more than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settle-
ment of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the per-
son substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action.”151 

(H) Is liable to the United States Government for a civil pen-
alty.... 
143 The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.jus 
tice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U6J4-5ZBR]. 
144 See 459 F. Supp. 2d 692, 692 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2005). This case in-
volved alleged falsification of annual reports to Medicare. 
145 See 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 234 (D.P.R. 2000). This case involved alleged 
false claims submitted to Medicare for anesthesia services. 
146 “Qui tam” is a term derived from the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro se, ipso in hac parte requites,” which means, “who as well for 
the king as himself sues in this matter.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (7th 
ed. 1999). 
147 Id. 
148 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2018). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. § 3730(h)(1). 
151 Id. § 3730(d). 
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 Because the FCA’s damages and penalty provisions tend 
to generate large dollar settlements and judgments, relators’ 
recoveries can involve substantial amounts.152 The following are 
a few examples: In 2013, Johnson and Johnson agreed to pay the 
federal government more than $2.2 billion to resolve commercial 
and civil liability under the FCA related to the prescription 
drugs Risperdal, Invega, and Natrecor.153 Pfizer, Inc. and its 
subsidiary, Pharmacia & Upjohn Company, Inc., agreed to pay 
$2.3 billion, one of the largest healthcare fraud settlements in 
history, for violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and to 
pay $1 billion under the FCA for illegally promoting various 
drugs, including Bextra, Geodon, Zyvox, and Lyrica.154 Global 
healthcare company GlaxoSmithKline agreed to plead guilty and 
pay $3 billion to resolve criminal and civil liability from the un-
lawful promotion of certain drugs and report safety violations, 
including $2 billion to resolve civil liabilities (including off-label 
promotion and kickbacks) under the FCA related to Paxil, Well-
butrin, and Avandia.155 The off-label settlement resolves four 
lawsuits pending in federal district court in Massachusetts un-
der the qui tam provisions of the FCA.156 
 The FCA qui tam provision contains two features that make 
it quite successful as a regulatory and external corporate govern-
ance tool. First, the law facilitates the dissemination of inside 
information of fraud.157 Complex financial crimes often cannot 

152 James F. Barger, Jr. et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical 
Study of Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465, 476 (2005). 
153 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than 
$2.2 Billion to Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-than-22-billion-resolve-crimi 
nal-and -civil-investigations [https://perma.cc/XV2P-47HQ]. 
154 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Announces 
Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-largest-health-care-fraud 
-settlement-its-history [https://perma.cc/5VKX-FBQE]. 
155 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and 
Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety 
Data (July 2, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty 
-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report [https://perma.cc 
/4RXA-7BFX]. 
156 Id. 
157 Carl Pacini & Michael. B. Hood, The Role of Qui Tam Actions Under 
the False Claims Act in Preventing and Deterring Fraud Against Government, 
15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 276 (2007). 
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be detected without the assistance of those who have knowledge 
of them.158 However, convincing people to inform or turn on their 
employer, co-workers, and partners is not an easy task.159 Second, 
the statute provides a means for knowledgeable qui tam plaintiffs 
to supplement the strained resources of government attorneys and 
investigators.160 This resource supplement is accomplished through 
the required statutory procedures or protocol.161 
 A qui tam relator who sues under the FCA does so both in 
an individual capacity and on behalf of the US government.162 A 
copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all 
material evidence and information possessed by the qui tam plain-
tiff must be filed in camera and a copy must be sent to the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ).163 “The purpose of the written disclosure 
requirement is to provide the United States with enough informa-
tion on alleged fraud to be able to make a well-reasoned decision 
on whether it should participate in the filed lawsuit or allow the 
relator to proceed alone.”164 
 Although FCA lawsuits have grown during the past dec-
ades, the federal government has declined to intervene in almost 
two-thirds of said lawsuits.165 When the federal government 
decides to not get involved, a case is much less likely to result in 
a recovery.166 From 1987 to September 30, 2017, FCA recoveries 
totaled over $36 billion.167 Over $28 billion, or close to 79 per-
cent of that total, has occurred when the US government inter-
vened.168 Much of the $36 billion recovered has involved health-
care fraud claims, which includes providers (e.g., hospitals, nursing 

158 Id. at 276–77. 
159 Phelps, supra note 140, at 248.  
160 Barger, Jr. et al., supra note 152, at 475–76. 
161 Id. at 476. 
162 Id. 
163 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2018). 
164 United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 555 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (quoting United States ex rel. Woodward v. Country View Care Ctr., 
Inc., 797 F. 2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
165 D. Baker, Comment, A Whole New World of False-Claims-Act Liability: 
The 2009 Amendments and Learning Where to Draw the Line, 61 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 201, 228 (2011). 
166 Id. 
167 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: CIVIL DIVISION, FRAUD STATISTICS—HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES 2017 (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-re 
lease/file/1020116/download [https://perma.cc/TUF5-7LZN]. 
168 Id. 
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homes, physicians), pharmaceutical firms, medical device makers, 
and suppliers.169 
 In the fiscal year ended September 30, 2016, the DOJ recov-
ered more than $4.7 billion in FCA civil cases.170 Of the $4.7 billion 
recovered, 53 percent (or over $2.5 billion) came from the health-
care industry.171 In the fiscal year ended September 30, 2017, 
the DOJ recouped more than $3.7 billion in FCA civil cases.172 Of 
that amount, over 64 percent (or $2.4 billion) involved healthcare 
industry claims.173 The FCA has become the primary law used to 
pursue healthcare fraud.174 
1.Qui Tam Elements 
 The FCA applies to a wide range of misconduct that is po-
tentially harmful to the federal treasury.175 In 2009, Congress 
enacted into law the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 
(FERA),176 which expanded liability exposure under the FCA. 
Prior to the enactment of FERA, liability did not attach under 
Section 3729(a)(1) unless a defendant presented a false claim for 
payment or approval to an “employee of the United States gov-
ernment or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States.”177 
Today, the false claim can be presented to anyone for payment, 
as long as the federal government has or will provide part or all 
of the money to pay the claim.178 

169 Deborah R. Farringer, From Guns That Do Not Shoot to Foreign Sta-
plers: Has the Supreme Court’s Materiality Standard Under Escobar Provided 
Clarity for the Health Care Industry About Fraud Under the False Claims 
Act?, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2018). 
170 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers Over 
$4.7 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false 
-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [https://perma.cc/RMR4-8CFD]. 
171 Id. 
172 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Recovers From 
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.jus 
tice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-falseclaims-act-cases 
-fiscal-year2017 [https://perma.cc/Q35Y-JFKS]. 
173 Id. 
174 See generally id. 
175 See generally 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
176 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 
Stat. 1617 (2009) (codified as amended in 18 and 31 U.S.C.). 
177 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006). 
178 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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a.“Claim” 
 The determination of whether an actual “claim” has been 
made is often not a simple task but is easier than before the 
amendments enacted by FERA. As amended by FERA, a “claim” 
is “any request or demand, whether under a contract or other-
wise, for money or otherwise, for money or property and whether 
the United States has title to the money or property.”179 “Claim” 
includes any demand for money or property if it is to be spent or 
used on behalf of the federal government or to advance a gov-
ernment program or interest.180 In some circumstances, lawyers 
and other parties must look to sources outside the FCA to ascer-
tain whether a “claim” has been adequately set forth.181 
 For instance, regulations and statutes define what is a 
“claim” for payment under Medicare. Under subparts of title 42 of 
the Code of Federal Regulation, the federal government promises to 
pay only costs that are “reasonable and necessary.”182 Hence, re-
questing the government to pay for medical tests under Medicare 
without the required physician supervision under part B is equiva-
lent to asking for payment for something that is not a contractual 
claim payable under part B.183 Lack of compliance with Part B’s 
regulations would potentially fail the “claim” requirement under 
Part B.184 
 The FCA does not attach liability to the underlying fraudu-
lent activity or to the government’s wrongful payment, but to the 
“claim for payment or approval.”185 In deciding whether a false 
statement is a claim or demand for payment or approval, a court 
should determine whether the statement had the practical effect 
of inducing wrongful payment.186 
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179 Id. § 3729(b)(2)(A). 
180 Id. § 3729(b)(2). 
181 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.15(4)(k), 415.50–70 (2018). 
182 Id. 
183 Kamal Al-Salihi, Keeping It Simple: Finding Falsity Under the False 
Claims Act, 36 WHITTIER L. REV. 431, 448 (2015). 
184 Id. 
185 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
186 United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709–10 (1st Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Richard Dattner Architects, 972 F. Supp. 738, 746–47 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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 An FCA claim must allege that the defendant submitted 
either a legally fraudulent or legally false claim.187 A legally 
false claim occurs when a government funds recipient has certi-
fied compliance with a regulation or law as a condition, but 
knowingly failed to comply.188 A factually false claim involves a 
reimbursement request containing an improper listing of services 
rendered or goods provided.189 Moreover, Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP) 9(b) requires a qui tam plaintiff to state with 
particularity the facts constituting fraud.190 It is significant to 
note that, since most FCA cases end in settlement,191 the deci-
sion on whether FRCP 9(b) has been met holds much importance 
in the upshot of a given FCA lawsuit.192 
b.Made “Knowingly” or “Know” 
 Section 3729(b)(1)(A) indicates that the presenter of in-
formation satisfies the “knowingly” or “knowledge” requirement 
if he or she “has actual knowledge ... acts in deliberate ignorance 
of the truth or falsity ... or acts in reckless disregard of the truth 
or falsity of the information” presented.193 The statute further 
provides that “no proof of specific intent to defraud” is necessary.194 
The requisite intent is the presentation of what is known to be 
false.195 
 Although the FCA does not provide a definition of reckless 
disregard, the concept embodies a conscious indifference to the 

187 Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., 830 F. Supp. 2d 8, 16 (D.N.J. 2011); 
see also United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 
295, 305 (3rd Cir. 2011). 
188 Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 701 (2d Cir. 2001). 
189 United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 
1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008). 
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
191 Latham’s Lauer on Defending False Claims Act Cases, 22 CORP. CRIM. 
REP. 8, 3 (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.lw.com/mediacoverage/lathams-lauer-on 
-defending-false-claims-act-cases [https://perma.cc/QE3U-7PFK]. 
192 Taylor Chenery & Nicholas A. Deuschle, Supreme Court Asked to Re-
view Pleading Standard and Constitutionality of FCA, BASS, BERRY & SIMS 
P.L.C.: INSIDE THE FCA (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.insidethefca.com/fca 
-pleading-standard-constitutionality/ [https://perma.cc/TB7V-BP42]. 
193 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
194 Id. § 3729(b)(1)(B). 
195 United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma Cty. Water Agency, 929 F. 2d 
1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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falsity of a claim.196 Negligence and innocent mistake, however, 
are not sufficient to establish liability.197 An interesting applica-
tion of the “knowingly” requirement in a healthcare scenario oc-
curred in United States v. Lorenzo.198 It is a fine application of 
reckless disregard meeting the knowledge requirement of the FCA. 
 By not requiring proof of specific intent to defraud, Con-
gress and the judiciary have extended liability to almost anyone 
associated with a false or fraudulent claim. Healthcare providers 
and others who submit claims for payment to the government thus 
have a strong incentive to make sure their claims are accurately 
presented. The knowledge requirement makes it risky for individu-
als to look the other way with regard to a fraudulent claim.199 
 The knowledge requirement is not always a simple ques-
tion of whether the qui tam defendant knew of the truth or falsity 
of a representation.200 Because many entities entailed in FCA 
litigation are large, multidimensional firms, some courts judicially 
impose a second test: not only must there exist an affirmative 
recognition of falsity, such falsity must be consciously presented 
to the government.201 
c.“False” or “Fraudulently” 
 The Supreme Court has stated that the FCA is not designed 
to reach every kind of fraud committed against the government.202 
The words “false” and “fraudulent” are not defined by Congress 

196 Al-Salihi, supra note 183, at 446. 
197 United States v. Oakwood Downriver Med. Ctr., 687 F. Supp. 302, 305 
(E.D. Mich. 1988). 
198 United States v. Lorenzo, 768 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1991). In that 
case, Dr. Lorenzo and several other dentists performed oral cancer screenings 
as part of routine dental examinations at nursing homes in Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey. Id. at 1129. The cancer screenings, after being billed to Medi-
caid, were then billed to Medicare as limited consultations. Id. at 1129–30. 
The evidence showed that Lorenzo knew that Medicare rules did not allow 
procedures during routine screenings to be deemed “limited consultations.” 
Id. at 1131. The district court found that Lorenzo, at the very least, acted in 
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the claims made. Id. at 1132. 
199 Christopher Frieden, Protecting the Government’s Interests: Qui Tam 
Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government’s Right to Veto Set-
tlements of Those Actions, 47 EMORY L. J. 1041, 1057–58 (1998). 
200 Id. at 1057. 
201 Hindo v. Univ. of Health Sci., 65 F.3d 608, 613 (7th Cir. 1995). 
202 United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 598 (1958). 
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in the FCA.203 These terms have been held by the Supreme 
Court, in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Escobar,204 to have meaning based on common law fraud con-
cepts. For example, because the FCA uses the disjunctive “or,” 
no need exists for a qui tam plaintiff to prove a claim is both 
false and fraudulent. Either will do.205 
 Historically, most healthcare FCA cases have involved di-
rect “‘factually false’ claims requesting payment for more expen-
sive categories of care than were provided or services that were 
never provided.”206 Qui tam plaintiffs also began to employ the 
law against “legally false” claims, where services or items were 
provided but the one seeking payment had untruthfully certified 
compliance with a statute, regulation, or contractual provision.207 
 The federal courts have sanctioned two distinct theories of 
legal falsity.208 Express certification occurs when a party makes 
a false certification concerning a program condition, such as signing 
a false certification statement on a document.209 Some federal 
courts have extended legal falsity to include implied certifica-
tion.210 In Escobar, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e hold that the implied certification theory can be a basis for 
liability, at least where two conditions are satisfied: first, the 
claim does not merely request payment, but also makes specific 
representations about the goods or services provided; and sec-
ond, the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with mate-
rial statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes 
those representations misleading half-truths.211 

203 31 U.S.C. § 3279 (2009). 
204 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
205 James B. Helmer, Jr. & Julie Popham, Materiality and the False Claims 
Act, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 845 (2003). 
206 United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 
1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008); Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Inter-
pretation, and the Quest for Fraud That “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 
2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1816 (2017). 
207 Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1217–18. 
210 Universal Health Serv., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1995 (2016). 
211 Id. at 2001. 
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The Court further held that a misrepresentation must be mate-
rial to the government’s payment decision.212 
 The Supreme Court tried to shed further light on the 
meaning of “materiality” in this context.213 “We need not decide 
whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality requirement is governed by 
§ 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law. Under any 
understanding of the concept, materiality look[s] to the effect on 
the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged mis-
representation.”214 On the other hand, if the government “pays a 
particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain 
requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that 
those requirements are not material.”215 
 The Escobar case left open a number of important ques-
tions, including the “threshold question of whether we now have 
a coherent test defining implied certification.”216 The confound-
ing new questions will generate more litigation over the implied 
certification theory.217 
 It seems that the emphasis of the Escobar decision is the 
new focus on the government’s behavior and the defendant’s 
knowledge of such behavior.218 Lower federal court cases appear 
to indicate a shift toward a materiality standard which requires 
evidence that the government was in fact influenced—that is, it 
knew of the noncompliance and chose to pay the claim anyway.219 
d.Materiality 
 Based on a straightforward reading of the FCA statute, the 
term “material” modifies the “false record” offered in support of a 
false claim, not the false claim itself.220 The false record or state-
ment supporting the false claim has to operate in a material way 
as a supporting document.221 Thus, the “materiality” requirement is 

212 Id. at 2002. 
213 Id. at 2003. 
214 Id. at 2002.  
215 Id. at 2003. 
216 Krause, supra note 206, at 1830. 
217 Id. 
218 Farringer, supra note 169, at 1258. 
219 United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 332 (9th Cir. 
2017); Farringer, supra note 169, at 1258. 
220 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
221 Al-Salihi, supra note 183, at 449. 
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germane only to a section 3729(a)(1)(B) cause of action, not a 
section 3729(a)(1)(A) lawsuit or legal claim.222 
 Whatever a healthcare provider or contractor is allegedly 
lying about does not have to be material to lead to section 
3729(a)(1)(A) or section 3729(a)(1)(B) liability. A threshold re-
quirement exists that any record used to undergird the accuracy 
of a false claim must actually support that claim.223 Although a 
trivial false claim can give rise to FCA liability, some courts 
have judicially grafted the term “material” on to a section 
3729(a)(1)(A) analysis (or claim).224 This approach interprets 
section 3729(a)(1)(A) as meaning that a healthcare provider faces 
FCA liability if he or she “knowingly presents, or causes to be 
presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” 
which is “material.”225 In reality, section 3729(a)(1)(A) does not 
state this requirement.226 
 In those cases that apply “materiality” to section 
3729(a)(1)(A) claims, the term is defined as whether the false or 
fraudulent claim has a natural tendency to influence agency action 
or is capable of influencing agency action.227 Contemporary courts 
that use a materiality standard for section 3729(a)(1)(A) claims 
use a case-by-case fact-intensive analysis to ascertain whether a 
particular condition of payment is material.228 In the end, the inser-
tion of materiality into a section 3729(a)(1)(A) analysis muddies 
what is actually a clear standard.229 
 A guilty fraudster under the FCA is liable to the federal 
government for a civil penalty of not less than $5000 and not 
more than $10,000, plus treble the amount of damages which 
the government sustains because of the fraudulent act.230 

222 Id. 
223 Id. at 450. 
224 United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 
394–95 (1st Cir. 2011) (providing an analysis of “material” in terms of the 
claim itself). 
225 Id. at 389. 
226 See generally 31 U.S.C § 3729 (2012). 
227 Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 394 (citations omitted). 
228 See United States v. Sci. Application Int’l. Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 
(D.C. Cir. 2010). 
229 Al-Salihi, supra note 183, at 451. 
230 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). 
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B.FCA Healthcare Fraud Lawsuits Facilitated by the Affordable 
Care Act 
 Before the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 (ACA),231 as modified by the Health Care Education and 
Reconciliation Act of 2010,232 the FCA had a strong limitation on 
filing a qui tam lawsuit, known as the public disclosure bar.233 
The FCA used to possess a two-part test to determine whether a 
federal court could hear a qui tam case.234 First, the court had to 
ascertain whether the fraud allegations were based on publicly 
disclosed material.235 If so, the court then had to assess whether 
the relator was an original source of the disclosure.236 In order to 
establish subject matter jurisdiction, the qui tam plaintiff had to 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the suit was not 
based upon a prior public disclosure, or, if it was, that he or she 
was an original source of the information.237 The FCA outlined 
three ways in which prior public disclosure could occur: (1) in a 
civil, criminal, or administrative hearing;238 (2) in a Congres-
sional, administrative, or GAO report, audit, or investigation;239 

231 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (amending various sections of the U.S. Code including the 
FCA and Anti-Kickback Statute). 
232 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
233 United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 
645, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
234 Id. at 651. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 653. 
237 United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th 
Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stan-
ford, Jr. Univ., 161 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1998). 
238 “Hearing” encompassed both civil complaints and criminal indictments. 
United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th 
Cir. 1994). With regard to administrative hearings, the issue of what constituted a 
“hearing” and thus a “public disclosure” was not so cut and dry. See, e.g., A-1 
Ambulance Serv. Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1244 (9th Cir. 2000); United 
States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 21 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614–15 
(E.D. La. 1998). 
239 In United States ex rel. Schwedt v. Planning Research Corp., 39 F. 
Supp. 2d 28, 31–32, 34 (D.D.C. 1999), an audit report prepared by the Office 
of Inspector General and reviewed by an outside accounting firm indicated 

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or (3) in the media.240 Generally, the courts broadly construed 
what types of disclosures were public and thus barred qui tam 
suits,241 even though some disputes existed among the courts.242 
 In the ACA, Congress lowered the disclosure bar so that 
only facts that are “substantially the same” as the facts disclosed 
in the prior proceeding would lead to the bar being imposed.243 
The bar now applies if the information on which the qui tam suit 
is based has been disclosed in a federal proceeding in which the 
government is a participant.244 The public disclosure bar does not 
apply when the qui tam plaintiff is an “original source” of the 
information’s provenance.245 Before the ACA, the public disclo-
sure bar prevented many qui tam claims that involved public 
information, as broadly construed.246 This change to the FCA has 
enhanced its potency as a weapon against healthcare fraud.247 
C.Federal Anti-Kickback Statute 
 The federal Anti-Kickback Statute248 is a criminal statute 
that prohibits knowingly and willfully paying or receiving any 
compensation, directly or indirectly, in cash or in kind, in exchange 
for prescribing, purchasing, or recommending any service, treat-
ment, or item for which payment will be made by Medicaid, 
Medicare, or any other federally funded program.249 The anti-
kickback statute is broadly drafted and establishes liability for 

that a government contractor had submitted flawed products while certifying 
their completeness. The district court held that a qui tam suit was based upon a 
public disclosure and was thus barred. 
240 United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 
1149 (3d Cir. 1991) (construing the term “hearing” to incorporate more than 
just formal proceedings; it includes any information disclosed in connection 
with criminal, civil, or administrative litigation). 
241 See Springfield Term. Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 654. 
242 Phelps, supra note 140, at 260. 
243 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
244 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
245 Id.; J. Hammond, What Exactly Is Healthcare Fraud After the Afforda-
ble Care Act?, 42 STETSON L. REV. 35, 53 (2012). 
246 Hammond, supra note 245, at 53.  
247 See id. 
248 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2017). 
249 D. Rheiner, Kickbacks and Contradictions: The Anti-Kickback Statute 
and Electronic Health Records, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 493, 500 (2015). 
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individuals and entities on not only kickbacks and bribes, but 
also an array of economic relationships that can be more complex 
than a simple payment for services.250 The purpose of the anti-
kickback statute is to prevent drains on the public treasury.251 
 In 1985, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals significantly 
expanded the scope of the anti-kickback statute in U.S. v. Greber.252 
The court established the “One Purpose Test,” holding that if one 
purpose of a payment was to induce future referrals, the ar-
rangement violated the anti-kickback statute.253 Although the 
anti-kickback statute does not afford a private right of action, 
the FCA254 provides a vehicle whereby individuals may bring qui 
tam actions255 alleging violations of the anti-kickback law. For a 
conviction under the anti-kickback statute, the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) 
knowingly and willfully; (2) solicited, received, paid, or offered to 
pay remuneration; (3) in return for, or to induce, a referral or 
generation of program-related business.256 The “knowing and will-
ful” element is met by demonstrating the defendant was aware 
his conduct was unlawful and acted voluntarily and purposely.257 
Further clarification of the first element was provided in U.S. v. 

250 F.T. Pyle III, Comment, The Federal Anti-Kickback Statute Has No Preemp-
tive Power, or Does It? Florida’s Supreme Court Holds Florida’s Medicaid 
Anti-Kickback Statute Unconstitutional, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 631, 636 (2007). 
251 United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., 874 F.2d 
20, 32 (1st Cir. 1989). 
252 See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 71 (3d Cir. 1985). 
253 Id. at 69.  
254 See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012). 
255 A qui tam plaintiff, also referred to as a qui tam relator, or a whistle-
blower, is a private citizen who files a civil lawsuit against an alleged fraudster 
on behalf of himself and the U.S. government. If the government does not pursue 
actions, the relator pursuing the case is entitled to “not less than 25 percent 
and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement.” 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).  
256 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b); United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234, 1251–52 
(11th Cir. 2013). 
257 Vernon, 723 F.3d at 1256 (“[T]his court concluded ... the word ‘willfully’ 
“means the act was committed voluntarily and purposely with the specific 
intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with a bad purpose, either to 
disobey or disregard the law.”). In 18 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2012) it states “with 
respect to violations of this section, a person need not have actual knowledge 
of this section as specific intent to commit a violation of this section.” 
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Mathur,258 which states “with respect to violations of this section, 
a person need not have “actual knowledge” of this section as “spe-
cific intent” to commit a violation of this section.259 
 The broad scope of the One Purpose Test has the potential 
to create liability under the anti-kickback statute for actions 
that are commonly accepted commercial arrangements.260 Par-
ties can also be liable under the Anti-Kickback Statute even if 
their actions cause no tangible harm to patients.261 For example, 
if a hospital offers a physician any remuneration to join its staff, 
intending that the doctor will refer Medicare patients to the 
hospital, it risks violating the One Purpose Test.262 
 The broad scope of potential liability under the statute 
gave rise to sufficient concern in Congress that numerous “safe 
harbors” or statutory exceptions were created.263 The Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) has listed over twenty-five regulatory 
safe harbor provisions and one statutory provision264 that pro-
tect physicians from liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute. 
Each transaction or alleged activity that falls within a safe harbor 
must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to ascertain whether 
it constitutes an anti-kickback violation.265  
 The following list is a partial enumeration of some of the 
safe harbor provisions: 

258 United States v. Mathur, 2012 WL 4742833, at *15 (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 
2012) (“[T]he [Affordable Care Act] has not removed a specific intent requirement 
from the Anti-Kickback Act ... the government must still show that a criminal 
defendant acted ‘knowingly and willingly’ in offering or paying remunerations in 
exchange for patient referrals. [The Act] simply clarified that the government 
is not required to show a criminal defendant specifically knew the Anti-Kickback 
Act prohibited offering or paying consideration to induce referrals and intended to 
violate the law.”). 
259 Id. 
260 James G. Sheehan & Jesse A. Goldner, Beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute: 
New Entities, New Theories in Healthcare Fraud Prosecutions, 40 J. HEALTH 
L. 167, 171 (2007). 
261 United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996). 
262 Polk Cnty. v. Peters, 800 F. Supp. 1451, 1456 (E.D. Tex. 1992). 
263 Safe harbors protect from prosecution-specific practices that would oth-
erwise violate the Anti-Kickback Statute. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(e)(iv)(B) 
(2017). 
264 See generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)–(y). 
265 CRAIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 530. 
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1. Investment safe harbor. This protects an investor 
who holds a security issued by an entity, provided 
he or she satisfies certain statutory requirements. 
This safe harbor applies to three types of securities: 
investments in large entities, in small entities, and 
in medically underserved areas.266 
2. Sale of physician practices. This is divided into two 
sections: sales to another practitioner and sales to a 
hospital or other entity. Each type of sale has dif-
ferent criteria.267 
3. Practitioner recruitment safe harbor. This is designed 
to allow areas that have difficulty attracting doctors 
to offer incentives to potential practitioners. Various 
conditions must be met.268 
4. Space rental, equipment rental, and personal services 
and management contracts. These safe harbors pre-
vent prosecution of such contracts if payments 
thereunder meet the following criteria: (1) the writ-
ten contract covers all of the property or services 
exchanged between the parties; (2) the contract is 
in writing and is signed by all the parties; (3) the 
schedule of use, length of each use, and exact rent 
is set for those property or services that are used 
only periodically; (4) the contract is for at least one 
year; (5) the payments are equal to fair market 
value and are set in advance; and (6) the space or 
amount of services is no more than necessary for a 
reasonable business purpose.269 
5. Referral services safe harbor. This protects organi-
zations that operate referral services for a fee, such 
as professional societies or consumer groups. The 
safe harbor does not extend to situations where the 
operator of the referral service adjusts the fees that it 
charges participating doctors based on the number 

266 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a) (2017). 
267 Id. § 1001.952(e). 
268 Id. § 1001.952(n). 
269 Id. § 1001.952(c).  
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of referrals the physician makes to the operator of 
the service.270 
6. Referral arrangements for specialty services. This 
is designed to allow a practitioner to refer a patient to 
another party for the provision of a specialty service 
under an agreement that the patient will be referred 
back at a specified time or under certain conditions.271 
7. Ambulance replenishing. Under the law, “remuner-
ation does not include any gift or transfer of drugs 
or medical supplies (including linens) by a hospital 
or other receiving facility to an ambulance provider 
for the provider (or first responder) in connection 
with the transport of a patient by ambulance to the 
hospital or other receiving facility if all the criteria 
in this safe harbor are met.272 
Under the law, “remuneration” does not include the transfer of 
any goods, items, services, donations, or loans (whether in cash 
or in-kind), or combination therefrom from an individual or entity 
to a health center, as long as nine specified standards are met.273 
 These regulatory safe harbors are drawn narrowly. “If an 
agreement does not meet the exact requirements of a safe harbor 
regulation, it is not immunized from liability under the Anti-
Kickback Statute.”274 “[A]n agreement is subject to the One Purpose 
Test if it does not fit precisely into a safe harbor, even if it is in sub-
stantial compliance with the requirements of the regulation.”275 
Many arrangements will not fit into the specific requirements of 
a certain specific harbor but the Department of Health and Human 
Services “[(]HHS[)] has no motivation to challenge these agree-
ments if they create no risk of tangible harm to patients or drain 
on the public fisc”.276 

270 Id. § 1001.952(f). 
271 Id. § 1001.952(s). 
272 Id. § 1001.952(v).
273 Id. § 1001.952(w). 
274 Rheiner, supra note 249, at 505. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
2020] INVESTIGATING HEALTHCARE FRAUD 517 
D.False Statements to Obtain Health Benefits or Payments 
 A little-known federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a), 
makes it a crime to make a false statement or representation in 
any application or claim for benefits under a federal healthcare 
program.277 Under this statute, the federal government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant made, or caused 
to be made, a statement or representation of material fact in an 
application for payment or benefits under a federal healthcare 
program; (2) the statement or representation was false; and (3) 
the defendant knowingly and willfully made the false statement 
or representation.278 
 The first element requires that a statement or representa-
tion of fact be material to be actionable.279 Materiality is a mixed 
question of law and fact.280 The customary common law test of 
materiality in false statement laws is whether the statement 
“has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, 
the decision of the decision-making body to which it was ad-
dressed.”281 The government does not have to prove actual reli-
ance on the false statement by the respective federal agency.282 
 The second element of the offense requires the defendant 
to utter or make a false statement or representation.283 The false 
statement or representation must have been submitted to the 

277 42 USC § 1320a-7b(a) (2018). 
278 Id. United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1994). 
279 United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 61–62 (5th Cir. 2013). In Njoku, a 
company named Family Healthcare Group, Inc. did business in Houston, Texas. 
The company was approved as a Medicare provider in 2005. Family Healthcare 
provided home healthcare to individuals by skilled nurses. Family Health 
Care was paid about $5.2 million for home healthcare services between April 
2006 and August 2009. Evidence at trial showed that Family Healthcare billed 
Medicare for services to beneficiaries who were ineligible for home healthcare, not 
in need of skilled nursing, or received services that were inadequate and mis-
represented in the documented nursing reports. Nursing notes were subject 
to audit by Medicare. The jury found that the nursing notes were material. 
Id. at 66–67. 
280 United States v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943,944, 948 (9th Cir. 1994). 
281 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988). 
282 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999); United States v. Rowe, 56 
F. 2d 747, 749 (2d Cir. 1932). 
283 Laughlin, 26 F.3d at 1526. 
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respective federal agency for payment.284 Examples include: bill-
ing Medicaid for procedures not actually performed,285 submitting 
claims for patients never examined,286 submitting claims for ser-
vices not personally rendered,287 and submitting claims for services 
rendered by another party.288 
 The third element of the offense is that the accused “know-
ingly and willfully” make or causes to be made any false repre-
sentation.289 “Knowingly” refers to the fact that proof must exist 
that the accused possessed knowledge of the facts that constitute 
the offense.290 The “knowing[ ] and willful[ ]” element is satisfied if 
the accused is aware his or her conduct is unlawful without any 
knowledge of the specific statute violated.291 Moreover, the ac-
cused must know that the statement is false at the time it is made 
or submitted.292 
E.The Stark Law 
 In 1989, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act, Congress enacted into law Stark I293 to counteract the growing 
cost of healthcare attributable to physician self-referrals.294 Stark I 

284 Id. 
285 United States v. Boesen, 541 F.3d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 2008). In this case, 
Dr. Boesen specialized in the medical and surgical treatment of the ears, 
nose, and throat. Between 2000 and 2002, Boesen’s clinic was regularly bill-
ing federal healthcare agencies for nasal endoscopy with debridement, cho-
lesteatoma removal, and otoacoustic emissions tests not actually done. 
286 United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case, 
Dr. Peter Larm, an allergist, was convicted of Medicaid fraud for submitting 
false claims for “office visits” where he neither saw or examined the patients 
nor personally rendered the services. 
287 Id. In Larm, the allergist also submitted claims for administration 
charges for injections which the patients administered themselves. Id.  
288 United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783, 785 (7th Cir. 2006). In this case, 
Davis, a psychologist, billed Medicaid for psychological services provided by 
employees in his employ who were not qualified to deliver them. Id.  
289 Laughlin, 26 F.3d at 1526. 
290 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 184 (1998). 
291 United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 837–38 (11th Cir. 1998) (altera-
tion in quote). 
292 United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 66–67 (5th Cir. 2013). 
293 See generally, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-239, § 6204 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2018)). 
294 W. Grioux, J. Maul, A. Delaplane, F. Hane, D. Josephy, N. Pfeiffer & P. 
Safirstein, Health Care Fraud, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1333 (2018). 
2020] INVESTIGATING HEALTHCARE FRAUD 519 
prohibited physician referrals under Medicare for clinical lab 
services when the referring physician has a financial relation-
ship with the lab unless the terms of certain statutory or regula-
tory exceptions are met.295 As part of the Omnibus Budget and 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Stark I was expanded into Stark II.296 
Stark II extended the Stark I legislation to Medicaid patients 
and to “designated health services” (DHS) other than clinical 
laboratory services.297 
 In general, the Stark Law (I and II collectively) and its 
accompanying regulations prohibit a physician (or an immediate 
family member) who has a “financial relationship” with a medical 
facility (e.g., a hospital) from making a “referral” to that facility for 
the furnishing of certain DHS for which payment can be made 
by the federal government.298 A medical facility may not submit 
for payment a Medicare or Medicaid claim for service provided 
pursuant to a forbidden referral.299 The federal government may 
not make payments pursuant to a prohibited claim and medical 
facilities must reimburse any payments that are mistakenly made 
by the federal government.300 
 The Stark Law took years to take effect: Stark I did not go 
into force until January 1, 1992.301 Enforcement of Stark II took 
effect on January 1, 1995.302 The final regulations of Stark II be-
came effective on January 4, 2002.303 Phase III regulations were 
published in September 2007, and the enhanced clarity of said 
regulations reduced the regulatory burden on the healthcare 
industry.304 The Stark law is complex, but its violation can carry 
severe penalties.305 

295 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (1992). 
296 P. BUCY ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, 
4.05 [1] and [6] (9th ed. 2002) (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66). 
297 Id. 
298 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1)(A) (2018); United States ex rel. Drakeford v. 
Tuomey Healthcare Sys., Inc., 675 F.3d 394, 397–98 (4th Cir. 2012). 
299 Drakeford, 675 F.3d at 397–98. 
300 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2018). 
301 BUCY ET AL., supra note 296, at 2–129 n.182. 
302 Id. at 4–89. 
303 Id. 
304 Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
15, 25 (2011). 
305 Id. at 34.  
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 Determination of whether a Stark law violation has oc-
curred entails a multistep analysis. The first step is to ascertain 
whether the person or entity involved has made a “referral.” The 
latter is “the request by a physician for, or ordering of, or the 
certifying or recertifying of the need for,” as well as the estab-
lishment of a plan of care by a physician that includes the provi-
sion of a DHS for which payment may be made under Medicare 
or Medicaid.306 While the Stark regulations do not expressly 
include any DHS provided by the referring physician, they do 
implicate referrals made within a physician’s group practice.307 
 The second step in the analysis is defining “physician.” A 
“physician” means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, a doctor of 
dental surgery or dental medicine, a doctor of podiatric medicine, a 
doctor of optometry, or a chiropractor.308 Nurse practitioners, 
physician’s assistants, and physical therapists do not fall within 
the definition.309 Another step in the analysis is specifying DHS. 
The latter includes the following: 
1. Clinical laboratory services. 
2. Physical therapy services. 
3. Occupational therapy services. 
4. Radiology services, including magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI), computerized axial tomography 
scans, and ultrasound services. 
5. Radiation therapy services and supplies. 
6. Durable medical equipment and supplies. 
7. Parental and enteral nutrients, equipment, and 
supplies. 
8. Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and 
supplies. 
9. Home health services. 
10.Outpatient prescription drugs. 
11. Inpatient and outpatient hospital services.310 
 One of the most significant determinations under the Stark 
law is whether a “financial relationship” exists between a physician 

306 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2018). 
307 Id. 
308 Id. 
309 Id.  
310 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6) (2018). 
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(or an immediate family member) and the entity to which the re-
ferral has been made. A “financial relationship” can fall into one 
or more of three categories: (1) an ownership interest; (2) an in-
vestment interest; or (3) a compensation arrangement between 
the physician (or immediate family member) and the entity.311 
Stark regulations specify that a financial relationship may be 
“direct” or “indirect.”312 A “direct” financial relationship exists “if 
remuneration passes between the referring physician (or a 
member of his or her immediate family) and the entity furnish-
ing DHS without any intervening persons or entities ....”313 An 
“indirect financial relationship” is present when three criteria 
are met.314 First, an unbroken chain of persons or entities must 
exist between the referring physician and the entity rendering 
DHS.315 Next, the referring physician must receive aggregate 
compensation that takes into consideration the volume or value 
of referrals or other business generated by the referring physi-
cian for the receiving entity.316 Third, the entity providing DHS 
must have actual knowledge (or act in reckless disregard or in 
deliberate ignorance of) the fact that the referring physician (or 
immediate family member) receives aggregate compensation 
that takes into account the volume or value of referrals.317 Some 
exceptions apply to the financial relationship prohibition.318 
 The last step is to consider the meaning of the word “entity” 
on the receiving end of a referral. “Entity” means “[a] physician’s 
sole practice or a practice of multiple physicians or any other per-
son, sole proprietorship, public or private agency or trust, corpo-
ration ... that furnishes DHS. An entity does not include the 

311 Id. § 1395nn(a)(2). 
312 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a)(1)–(2) (2018). 
313 Id. § 411.354(a)(2). 
314 Id. §§ 411.354(b)–(c). 
315 Id. §§ 411.354 (b)(5)(i), (c)(2)(i). 
316 Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(ii). 
317 Id. § 411.354(c)(2)(iii). 
318 Exceptions to the Stark law “financial relationship” element fall into 
three general categories: 1) all-purpose ownership and compensation arrange-
ments; 2) ownership and investment exceptions; and 3) direct and indirect 
compensation arrangement exceptions. The latter categories are the target for 
critics of the statute’s complexity and focus of the statute itself. Paula Tironi, 
The “Stark” Reality: Is the Federal Physician Self-Referral Law Bad for the 
Health Care Industry?, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 238 (2010). 
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referring physician ... but does include his or her medical prac-
tice.”319 This definition means that physicians or physician group 
practices that perform DHS must now meet an exception to the 
Stark law.320 
 In cases where a physician has made a referral for DHS to 
an entity with which he or she has a financial relationship, the 
next question is whether an exception to the law applies. Excep-
tions fall into three categories: (1) exceptions applicable to both 
physician ownership/investment interests and compensation 
arrangements; (2) exceptions for ownership or investment interests 
only; and (3) exceptions for compensation arrangements only.321 
 The first exceptions category includes doctors’ “services 
where referrals are between members of the same group prac-
tice,322 certain ancillary services rendered within the same office 
of a group practice [(this is the most commonly used exception)],323 
and certain prepaid health plans.”324 The second exceptions cat-
egory includes ownership interests in publicly traded securities, 
healthcare facilities in rural areas or Puerto Rico, and hospitals 
meeting certain requirements.325 The third exceptions category 
covers the rental of office space and equipment, genuine employ-
ment relationships, personal services arrangements, physician 
recruitment activities, and payments by doctors for certain items 
and services.326 
 The federal regulations that relate to these exceptions are 
complex and require intensive analysis. Some of the matters which 
must be scrutinized include, for example, whether doctors in a 
group practice spend the required number of hours with patients 
per week providing non-DHS services,327 and whether the amount 
of space leased exceeds the amount deemed “reasonable and 
necessary” for legitimate business purposes.328 

319 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2018) (alteration in quotation). 
320 Sutton, supra note 304, at 27–28; Grioux et al., supra note 294, at 1368. 
321 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(b)–(e) (2010).  
322 Sutton, supra note 304, at 30 (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(1) (2010)). 
323 Id. 
324 Id. 
325 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(c)–(d) (2010). 
326 Id. §§ 1395nn(e)(1)–(8). 
327 Id. § 411.355(b)(2)(A)(2) (2009). 
328 Sutton, supra note 304, at 30 (referencing 42 C.F.R. § 411.357(a)(3) (2009)). 
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 Penalties for violations of the Stark law can be severe. 
Claims filed for services in violation of self-referrals mean non-
payment.329 Moreover, if one collects money in violation of the 
Stark law, the money must be refunded.330 Improper claims may 
result in civil monetary penalties up to $15,000 per violation and 
exclusion from participating in Medicaid and Medicare pro-
grams.331 Also, a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 applies to 
cross-referral arrangements when a physician or entity “knows 
or should know” that the arrangement serves to assure referrals 
by the physician to the entity.332 
 In February 2018, the Bipartisan Budget Act outlined 
changes to the Stark law.333 Holdovers in personal services ar-
rangement exceptions and equipment exceptions are now indefi-
nite; previously they had been limited to six months.334 
F.Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
 In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA),335 which expanded the fight 
against healthcare fraud in numerous ways. First, HIPAA ex-
panded the coverage of the Anti-Kickback Statute to include all 
federal healthcare programs.336 Next, HIPAA widened the defi-
nition of a kickback.337 Controversy existed at one time as to 
whether waiving a copayment or deductible constituted remu-
neration to induce patients to utilize a given provider.338 Section 
231 of HIPAA specifically states that waiving a copayment is a 

329 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(1) (2010). 
330 Id. § 1395nn(g)(2).  
331 Id. § 1395nn(g)(3). 
332 Id. § 1395nn(g)(4). 
333 See Kristina Sherry et al., 2018 Changes to the Federal Physician Self-
Referral Law, NELSON HARDIMAN NEWSROOM (March 20, 2018), https://www.nel 
sonhardiman.com [https://perma.cc/B2VJ-5QH].  
334 Id.  
335 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c). 
336 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–b applies to anything “under a federal health care 
program.” 
337 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(7). 
338 A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud in Montana, 61 MONT. L. 
REV. 175, 199 (2000). 
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kickback unless it is done for a documented financial need or 
represents failure to collect after reasonable efforts.339 HIPAA 
also extends this to all federal healthcare programs except the 
Federal Employee Health Benefit Program.340 Under HIPAA 
and the Anti-Kickback Statute, remuneration includes the routine 
or partial waiver of coinsurance and deductibles as well as the 
transfer of items or services for free or less than market value.341 
There is a safe harbor for waivers not routinely offered.342 
 HIPAA also changed the money laundering, asset forfei-
ture and injunctive relief statutes to cover “federal health care 
offenses.”343 Significantly, HIPAA amended a federal criminal 
forfeiture statute with a new section containing mandatory for-
feiture language that states a court “shall order the person [con-
victed of a federal health care offense] to forfeit property, real or 
personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, 
from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the offense.”344 
The use of criminal forfeiture represents a step forward in 
healthcare fraud cases, but civil forfeiture would provide federal 
law enforcement authorities the power to seize the assets or 
funds of healthcare fraudsters sooner, reducing the chance that 
assets or funds could be dissipated or moved. HIPAA also widened 
the fraud injunction statute, authorizing the federal government 
to commence a civil lawsuit to enjoin the commission of a federal 
healthcare offense and to freeze the assets of fraudsters dispos-
ing or trying to dispose of assets acquired as a result.345 
 In United States v. Sriram, the federal government filed 
suit against Dr. Krishnaswami Sriram for fraudulently acquir-
ing over $1 million in false Medicare claims.346 Besides asserting 
claims for civil penalties and treble damages under the FCA, the 

339 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7a(i)(6) (2018). 
340 Id. § 1320a-7b(f). The expressed definition includes “any plan or program 
that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, 
which is funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government 
(other than the health insurance program under chapter 89 ....).” Id. 
341 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6) (2018). 
342 Id. 
343 Eddy, supra note 338, at 198. 
344 Id. (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7) (2018)).  
345 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7) (2018). 
346 United States v. Sriram, 147 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
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government sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against 
Sriram and froze certain assets (over $1.6 million).347 
 HIPAA has also had other significant effects in the fight 
against healthcare fraud. HIPAA is the first federal statute that cre-
ates a federal crime of healthcare fraud committed against private 
healthcare plans.348 HIPAA also created five new healthcare-
related crimes, four of which were felonies and one a misde-
meanor.349 The new crimes created are: (1) healthcare fraud;350 
(2) theft or embezzlement in connection with healthcare;351 (3) false 
statements relating to healthcare matters;352 and (4) obstruction of 

347 Id. at 949. 
348 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 241–247, 249, 110 Stat. 1936 (1997) (codified at 18 
U.S.C.A. § 24). 
349 Grioux et al., supra note 294, at 1372. 
350 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (2018). For conviction, this statute requires the gov-
ernment to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 1) knowingly 
and willfully executed or attempted to execute, a scheme or artifice to 2) de-
fraud a healthcare benefit program or to obtain by false or fraudulent pre-
tenses any money or property under the custody or control of a healthcare 
benefit program and 3) in connection with the delivery of or payment for 
healthcare benefits, items, or services. Examples include United States v. 
Morgan, 505 F.3d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 2007) (defendant convicted of twelve 
counts of healthcare fraud to defraud Medicare by signing a Certificate of 
Medical Necessity (CMN) for motorized wheelchairs for patients that the de-
fendant did not examine and who were not medically eligible for wheelchairs); 
United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 640 (6th Cir. 2008) (conviction for 
healthcare fraud where the doctor submitted claims to Medicare for tests that 
had not been determined to be medically necessary since the defendant had 
not examined the patients); United States v. Gelin, 712 F.3d 612, 614 (1st 
Cir. 2013) (two defendants convicted of violating § 1347 from making false claims 
to and obtaining payment from, insurers participating in Massachusetts’ no-
fault auto insurance program. Congress did not limit the scope of § 1347 to 
health insurers).  
351 18 U.S.C. § 669 (2018). For a conviction under this section, the govern-
ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and 
willingly embezzled, stole, intentionally misapplied, or otherwise converted any of 
the property or assets of a healthcare program. This statute allows federal prose-
cutions of embezzlements from private health plans. United States v. Lucien, 
347 F.3d 45, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2003). 
352 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2018). To convict a person of making false statements 
relating to healthcare matters, the government must prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the 1) person knowingly and willingly made false statements 
or representations 2) in connection with the delivery of or payment for health-
care benefits, items, or services and 3) in a matter involving a healthcare bene-
fit program. United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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criminal healthcare investigations.353 The penalties include a 
maximum prison term of five to ten years.354 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite increasing efforts by the U.S. government, law en-
forcement agencies, and federal and private health insurance pro-
grams, healthcare fraud remains a widespread problem. Countless 
individual victims have had to deal with the consequences, such 
as false information added to their medical records, damaged credit 
ratings, and unnecessary medical bills. Moreover, Medicare, 
Medicaid and other federal healthcare programs have been and 
continue to be hit by tens of billions of dollars in fraudulent claims. 
Fraud schemes committed by healthcare providers, organized 
crime, and others cost more than just money; these frauds shake 
the public’s trust in a system that should engender confidence. 
 Society and the federal government are not without pow-
erful statutory weapons to fight healthcare fraud. This Article 
analyzes the major federal civil and criminal laws relied on to 
combat healthcare fraud, including the Federal False Claims Act 
(FCA), the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) 
of 2010, the Stark Law, a law against false statements to obtain 
health benefits or payments, the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
and the mail and wire fraud statutes. 
 The FCA is a civil law but represents the single most po-
tent federal law available to combat healthcare fraud. One factor 
that makes the FCA so powerful is the qui tam legal action in 
which a private citizen can obtain a monetary reward of fifteen 
to thirty percent of any settlement or verdict in a healthcare 
fraud case committed against the United States.355 The PPACA 
loosened the public disclosure bar formerly faced by qui tam 

353 18 U.S.C. § 1518a (2018). A conviction requires that the government prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant willfully prevented, obstructed, 
misled, delayed or attempted to prevent, obstruct, mislead, or delay the com-
munication of information or records relating to a violation of a federal health-
care offense to a criminal investigator. See United States v. Franklin-El, 554 
F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2009). 
354 Eddy, supra note 338, at 197. 
355 See supra Section II.A. 
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plaintiffs.356 This PPACA feature has enhanced the FCA as a 
weapon to combat healthcare fraud. The Stark Law is a federal civil 
law aimed at preventing and deterring physician self-referrals 
for certain designated health services.357 
 A less well-known federal statute makes it a crime to make 
a false statement or representation in any claim for benefits 
under a federal healthcare program. The federal Anti-Kickback 
Statute is a criminal law that prohibits paying or receiving any-
thing of value in exchange for prescribing, purchasing, or rec-
ommending any medical treatment or item paid for with federal 
money.358 HIPAA established several new federal healthcare 
fraud crimes, including private insurance plan healthcare fraud, 
healthcare embezzlement, false statements relating to health-
care, and obstruction of criminal health investigations.359 Federal 
mail and wire fraud statutes have also been utilized to prosecute 
healthcare fraudsters. 
 The fight against healthcare fraud is important for Amer-
ican society. Every dollar saved or recovered from fraud can be 
used to ensure people have access to better healthcare services. 
Significant fines and damages have been collected and more prison 
sentences meted out in recent years for healthcare fraud offenses. 
The most current report from the DOJ states that, during fiscal 
year 2014, the Federal government won or negotiated over $2.3 
billion in healthcare fraud settlements and judgments.360 Also in 
fiscal year 2014, 734 defendants were convicted of healthcare 
fraud-related crimes, 782 new civil healthcare fraud investiga-
tions were opened, and 957 healthcare fraud matters were pend-
ing.361 Despite these recent successes, the battle must continue 
until healthcare fraud is a vanishingly rare occurrence. 
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356 Id. 
357 See supra Section II.E. 
358 See supra Section II.C. 
359 See supra Section II.F. 
360 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PRO-
GRAM FY 2014 1 (2015). 
361 Id. 
